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Original Research Article
Emotional AI, soft biometrics and
the surveillance of emotional life:
An unusual consensus on privacy
Andrew McStay
Abstract
By the early 2020s, emotional artificial intelligence (emotional AI) will become increasingly present in everyday objects
and practices such as assistants, cars, games, mobile phones, wearables, toys, marketing, insurance, policing, education
and border controls. There is also keen interest in using these technologies to regulate and optimize the emotional
experiences of spaces, such as workplaces, hospitals, prisons, classrooms, travel infrastructures, restaurants, retail and
chain stores. Developers frequently claim that their applications do not identify people. Taking the claim at face value,
this paper asks, what are the privacy implications of emotional AI practices that do not identify individuals? To investigate
privacy perspectives on soft non-identifying emotional AI, the paper draws upon the following: over 100 interviews with
the emotion detection industry, legal community, policy-makers, regulators and NGOs interested in privacy; a workshop
with stakeholders to design ethical codes for using data about emotions; a UK survey of 2068 citizens on feelings about
emotion capture technologies. It finds a weak consensus among social stakeholders on the need for privacy, this driven
by different interests and motivations. Given this weak consensus, it concludes that there exists a limited window of
opportunity to societally agree principles of practice regarding privacy and the use of data about emotions.
Keywords
Affective computing, biometrics, consensus, data protection, emotional AI, group privacy
This article is a part of special theme on Big Data and Surveillance. To see a full list of all articles in this special
theme, please click here: https://journals.sagepub.com/page/bds/collections/hypecommerciallogics
Emotional AI refers to technologies that use affective
computing and artificial intelligence techniques to
sense, learn about and interact with human emotional
life. This paper assesses the privacy implications of
these technologies and organizational applications
employed to make inferences about emotions, feelings,
moods, perspective, attention and intention. While at
an embryonic stage, they are becoming increasingly
present in everyday objects and practices such as assis-
tants, cars, games, mobile phones, wearables, toys,
marketing, insurance, policing, education and border
control. They are also being used to regulate and opti-
mize the emotionality of spaces, such as workplaces,
hospitals, prisons, classrooms, travel infrastructures,
restaurants, retail and chain stores. To explore these
developments, this paper asks, what are the privacy
implications of emotional AI practices that do not
identify individuals? The question arises from commer-
cial and other interests in soft biometrics that entail
categorization of bodily traits where a person may
not be identified in the process. Emotion is an example
of soft biometric trait profiling. To investigate the pri-
vacy implications of using non-personally identifying
data about people to try to infer emotions, this paper
situates its discussion in the context of burgeoning
interest in emotional AI and (separately) group-
focused privacy. It draws on three sources of empirical
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insight: firstly, over 100 interviews with data regulators,
privacy-oriented NGOs, policymakers, legal actors and
diverse industrial and service sectors interested in data
about emotions. The second source is a UK national
survey conducted on citizens’ attitudes towards emo-
tional AI. The third source is a multi-stakeholder
workshop conducted to co-create ethical codes of con-
duct for employing emotional AI. In conclusion, the
paper observes a weak consensus on the need for pri-
vacy, albeit driven by different motivations. It argues
that this temporary consensus should be seized to
implement regulation on these emergent technologies.
On emotion sensing
The practice of using computer sensing to interact with
emotional life has origins in the 1990s, with the field of
affective computing (Picard, 1997, 2007). What McStay
(2016, 2018) terms ‘emotional AI’ and ‘empathic
media’ are made possible through weak, narrow and
task-based AI efforts to see, read, listen, feel, classify
and learn about emotional life. This involves data
about words, images, facial expressions, gaze direction,
gestures, voices and the body, that in turn encompasses
heart rate, body temperature, respiration and electrical
properties of skin. Given that this paper is interested in
physiological inferences, input features might be facial
expressions, voice samples or biofeedback data. The
output is named emotional states that are then used
for a given purpose. Applicable machine learning tech-
niques vary, but frequently involve convolutional
neural nets (useful for images and system efficiency
gains), region proposal networks (useful for multiple
object recognition) and recurrent neural networks
(that draw on recent past data to determine how they
respond to new input data).
Output emotional states are used to enhance inter-
action with devices and media content; create new
forms of toys and entertainment; make experiences
more immersive; enhance artistic expression; surveil
and enable learning; facilitate self-understanding of
moods and well-being; optimise and regulate behaviour
in closed spaces (e.g. prisons and travel infrastruc-
tures); judge risk (e.g. by providing car insurance com-
panies data about reactivity); surveil and measure
emotionality of bounded spaces (such as retail outlets
or cities); surveil customers and worker performance;
provide emotional reactivity feedback to marketers and
facilitate creation/targeting of advertising.
The ‘basic emotions’ methodology (Ekman and
Friesen, 1971, McDuff and el Kaliouby, 2017) that sits
behind much emotional AI has been widely critiqued
(Andrejevic, 2013; Leys, 2011; Russell, 1994). Indeed,
the 2018 AI Now Report debunks it as pseudoscience,
linking facial coding with phrenology (Whittaker et al.,
2018). This critique is extreme, although practitioners
and vendors of emotional AI recognise that single labels
rarely capture complex emotional andaffectivebehaviour
(Gunes and Pantic, 2010). The key problem with face-
based approaches is that they are based on reverse
inference where an expression is taken to signify the
experience of an emotion (Barrett et al., 2019). This is
problematic because ‘similar configurations of facial
movements variably express instances of more than
one emotion category’ (Barrett et al., 2019), which
indicates that more detail on the context of the situ-
ation is required to understand the emotion. This
requires more data and potentially more invasive prac-
tices (McStay and Urquhart, 2019).
Application of emotion tracking has progressed from
in-house research facilities (such as those used in neuro-
marketing to detect responses to adverts) to online and
physical contexts. Including emojis (Davies, 2016; Stark
andCrawford, 2015),wearables (Lupton, 2016;Neff and
Nafus, 2016; Picard, 1997), human–robot interaction
(Bryson, 2018), education (Williamson, 2017), retail
(Turow, 2017), employee behaviour (Davies, 2015;
Grandey et al., 2013) and border control (Sa´nchez-
Monedero and Dencik, 2019), the broader business
strategy for emotional AI companies is ubiquitous
usage of automated emotion detection in all personal,
commercial and public contexts. To suggest a broad
rule, if there is any form of value in understanding emo-
tion in a given context, emotional AI has scope to be
employed. Companies interested in emotional AI
include established companies such as NEC, IBM,
Apple, Google, Microsoft and Facebook, but also a
long list of smaller companies (such as Eyeris, Sensing-
Feeling andAffectiva) seeking todefine newmarkets (for
an extended list, see Emotional AI, 2018).
On privacy: Towards a common good
Despite liberal roots in respect for individuality, self-
hood, autonomy and control, it is clear that privacy
includes these principles but is not synonymous with
them. Critically for this paper, privacy is not only an
individual right, but a group right because it is a col-
lective good. Further, given what is at stake – bodies,
emotions and experience – dignity (for individuals and
groups) remains especially important in ubiquitous
computing contexts (Edwards, 2016).
A dignity-based understanding diagnoses the prob-
lems with passive profiling and using Big Data techni-
ques about emotions for unconscious influence: it is
about recognising that phenomenological experience
is important, innately worthy and should not be appro-
priated. Applied to the body and face expressions, this
is not moral idling as the blog for the European Data
Protection Supervisor (Europe’s data protection
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authority) states, ‘Turning the human face into another
object for measurement and categorisation by auto-
mated processes controlled by powerful companies
and governments touches the right to human dignity’
(Wiewiorowski, 2019). Dignity also serves to block
conceptions of privacy as an indirect expression of
other rights, such as property. As Floridi (2016) puts
it, the ‘my’ in ‘my data’ is not the same as the ‘my’ as in
‘my car’, because personal, sensitive and intimate infor-
mation plays a constitutive role of who we are.
On privacy as a common good, Floridi (2014) points
out that the right to privacy is not just an individual
right, it is a group right: it is held by a group as a group,
rather than by its members. Momentarily leaving to
one side legal discussion of re-identification and
mosaic effects, the logic of Big Data profiling is
rarely based on targeting individuals. To quote Floridi:
There are very few Moby-Dicks. Most of us are sar-
dines. The individual sardine may believe that the
encircling net is trying to catch it. It is not. It is
trying to catch the whole shoal. It is therefore the
shoal that needs to be protected, if the sardine is to
be saved. (2014: 3)
Floridi’s (2014) sardines also connect well with affinity
profiling in online behavioural advertising where pro-
filing ‘does not directly infer sensitive data (“special
category data”) but rather measures an “affinity”
with a group defined by such data’ (Wachter, 2020/
forthcoming: 5). Wachter’s focus is on assumed inter-
ests as a proxy for personal traits, but the principle of
indirect inference is interesting because data collected
about emotional conditions may be collected by
group aggregate, but will impact them personally,
albeit not through strictly speaking personal data.
The interest in online advertising has parallel with
urban smart advertising that makes use of emotional
AI (McStay, 2016; McStay and Urquhart, 2019). For
example, groups of people that move daily through
urban spaces (such as a commuter-line train stations)
will by default become identifiable groups clustered by
psycho-physiological emotional reactivity. They will
occur through intimate objectification (granular assess-
ment of reactivity) and special treatment distinct from
commuters in other parts of a city, based on collection
of data that they have no control over.
Regulatory context: Emotional AI and
soft biometrics
The value of group-oriented body-focused privacy cri-
tique becomes clear when cast against European Union
(EU) regulation on data protection. The EU is a useful
benchmark as it has the most stringent data protection
and privacy standards in the world: thus, if the EU is not
adequately prepared to legally address emotion sensing,
arguably, nowhere else will be. In general, as stated in
Article 4(1) of the General Data Protection Directive
(GDPR), EU directives and regulations exist to protect
personal data. This is when information can be used to
identify or single out a person from others, so they can
be treated differently. If the information in question is
not personal data, the regulations do not apply. Yet, the
EDPS, through Opinion 4/2015 on data, technology and
dignity, moves towards group privacy sentiment stating
that Big Data ‘should be considered personal even where
anonymisation techniques have been applied’, although
adding that ‘it is becoming ever easier to infer a person’s
identity by combining allegedly ‘anonymous’ data with
other datasets including publicly available information’
(2015: 6). While the overall point focuses on personal
identity, it is multi-staged, i.e. in the first instance such
data should be considered personal upfront (even if not
identifying). Following this thinking, if personal in the
first instance, then it follows that it will be also sensitive
(as per Article 9 of GDPR, requiring explicit opt-in)
because it has scope to involve identifying biometrics.
However, this is notable opinion rather than law. Oddly,
the GDPR makes no reference whatsoever to emotions.
Similarly, a proposal for the revised ePrivacy directive
rarely mentions emotions (European Commission,
2017). Only recitals 2 and 20 mention emotions
although, importantly, recital 2 defines them as highly
sensitive. Yet, while introduced, emotions do not appear
in the articles of the proposed ePrivacy directive. To an
extent this is understandable because ‘emotion’ is an
imprecise word (including social media sentiment anal-
ysis and Big Data inferencing, such as mood tracking of
Spotify usage, as well as ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ biometrics).
However, given the increasing role of emotion in data
analytics and facilitating human–machine interaction,
the absence is still surprising.
Although GDPR makes no reference to emotions, it
does address identifying (or hard) biometric data.
Article 4(14) defines it thus:
‘biometric data’ means personal data resulting from
specific technical processing relating to the physical,
physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natu-
ral person, which allows or confirm the unique identi-
fication of that natural person, such as facial images or
dactyloscopic data. (European Commission, 2016: 34)
The laws on personally identifiable biometric data are
stringent. Article 9(1) asserts conditions required to
process identifying biometric data. The most important
for emotional AI is the need for explicit consent
(see Article 9(2)a). However, if the data in use cannot
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identify an individual or single them out in some way,
it follows that the regulation does not apply. This is
especially pertinent for out-of-home emotional analyt-
ics that do not rely on personal devices to track
people.1 Also relevant is Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party’s Opinion 3/2012 on developments in bio-
metric technologies. This states that biometric data ‘by
their very nature, are directly linked to an individual’
(Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2012: 2),
also pointing out that this data may be defined in terms
of ‘biological properties, behavioural aspects, physio-
logical characteristics, living traits or repeatable actions
where those features and/or actions are both unique to
that individual and measurable’ (Article 29 Data
Protection Working Party, 2012: 3–4).
Importantly, the Article 29 Opinion states that:
Mention should also be made to the use of the so-called
soft biometrics defined by the use of very common
traits not suitable to clearly distinguish or identify an
individual but that allow enhancing the performance of
other identification systems. (Article 29 Data
Protection Working Party, 2012: 16)
The Opinion reflects the biopolitical understanding
employed in this paper that focuses on commercial
rather than governmental dimensions. For example,
Article 29 (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party,
2012: 17) says that soft biometrics opens the door ‘to
uses far different from large scale security applications’
and that ‘gaming and retail will benefit from an
enhanced man-machine interaction allowing more
than identification, or categorisation of an individual’.
The other two relevant passages in the Opinion are:
Moreover some systems can secretly collect informa-
tion related to emotional states or body characteristics
and reveal health information resulting in a nonpro-
portional data processing as well as in the processing
of sensitive data in the meaning of article 8 of the
Directive 95/46/EC. (Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party, 2012: 17)
More recently it is not only identity that can be deter-
mined from a face but physiological and psychological
characteristics such as ethnic origin, emotion and well-
being. The ability to extract this volume of data from
an image and the fact that a photograph can be taken
from some distance without the knowledge of the data
subject demonstrates the level of data protection issues
which can arise from such technologies. (Article 29
Data Protection Working Party, 2012: 21)
Implicit within the soft biometric approach is that by
definition it cannot ‘single out’ a person or device. If it
is able to do so, it tips into the category of hard bio-
metrics. This raises a biopolitical conundrum because,
as already argued, such data about emotions is intimate
and sensitive, yet not legally personal. This echoes
observations about big group-based data profiling
that may also take place without identifying individuals
and/or using any personal data (Wachter, 2019). This
raises urgent governance questions, and privacy con-
ceived as collective violation is left wanting. While prin-
cipally interested in scope for group discrimination,
Mittelstadt’s remedy for how group rights should be
exercised also applies to use of emotional AI that
does not identify in that ‘an educated guess can be
made about what the group would value if given the
opportunity to assemble and act collectively’ (2017:
485).
In addition to the need for group privacy protec-
tions, there is another issue for concern about emotion
tracking. That is, despite being about the body, modern
regulation of soft biometrics speaks of data rather than
privacy. Whereas the original Data Protection
Directive (that GDPR replaces) frequently mentions
privacy, in GDPR this is radically downplayed in pref-
erence of ‘data protection’. Lynskey (2015) suggests
comparing Article 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) to the protection offered by
data protection law. She observes that data protection
law has little to say about an intrusive strip-search, but
this would be accounted for by Article 8 of ECHR that
demands respect for private and family life. This
presents a different picture from that found in data
protection legislation that focuses on identification as
the primary route to harm. What is clear is that an
account of emotional AI based solely on data tracking
and identification is a limited one. This paper reasons
that as emotion tracking emerges, a broader dignity-
based understanding to questions of commercial power
and data privacy is required. Given that a quintessen-
tial attribute of dignity and humanity is physical,
mental and experiential self-determination, how do
influential stakeholders conceive of privacy in intimate
contexts?
Methods
So far, this paper has identified a lacuna in critical lit-
erature on emotional AI and privacy, and in European
law regarding soft biometrics and non-identifying
usage of data about emotions. To explore what stake-
holders think about ethics and emotional AI, this paper
draws on insights derived from interviews with relevant
stakeholders, a workshop with stakeholders to design
ethical codes for using data about emotions and a UK
survey to gauge citizen feelings about emotion capture
technologies.
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Interviews
The first source of insight comprises interviews with
stakeholders directly interested in emotional AI. The
objective here was to obtain understanding about the
composition and scope of the emotional AI industry,
what it does, why it does it, where it is heading and
what stakeholders see as the main ethical issues. Across
2015–2017, 108 open-ended 1-hour interviews were
conducted to elucidate views from industry, policy-
makers concerned with data and national security,
municipal authorities and privacy-oriented NGOs.2
Of these 108 interviews, 33 entailed discussion of
non-identifying emotional AI, privacy and ethics.
Many interviewees prefer not to be named in person
or by company, but the categories are as follows:
• Industry (including a household name social media
company, another global technology company,
voice analytics, smart city vendors, market research-
ers using emotional AI, adtech firms, advertising
agencies, a well-known insurance company and an
online security firm). Interview number¼ 21.
• Data protection NGOs (including representatives of
Privacy International, Electronic Frontier
Foundation and Open Rights Group). Interview
number¼ 6.
• Self-regulation and law (including an advertising self-
regulator, a member of DG Connect, a global legal
privacy association and three law firms that handle
media and technology cases). Interview number¼ 6.
This paper focuses on this sample, although it is indi-
rectly informed by contextual norms, values and atti-
tudes encountered in the wider interviewing process.
The sampling strategy was based on two factors:
knowledge saturation and diversity (Bertaux, 1981).
Variety was important because the study sought a
broad understanding of interest in emotional AI at
this early stage of its application. These included geo-
graphically varied organisations from the US, UK,
France, Belgium, Estonia, Israel, Russia, United
Arab Emirates and South Korea. The size of compa-
nies ranged from global (e.g. Alphabet (Verily), Philips,
IBM and Facebook) to start-ups (mostly from London
and San Francisco).
Interviewees comprised chief executive officers and
individuals in strategic positions from the following
sectors: advertising and marketing; policing and
national security; education; insurance; angel invest-
ment; in-car experience and navigation; human resour-
ces and workplace management; sports; sex toys and
psychosexual therapy; mental health; ethical hacking;
art; and media, interactive film and games companies.
Each sector was selected on the basis of their current
work in emotion detection, or likelihood of interest in
these applications. In addition to industrialists and
public sector actors, people working in privacy-
friendly NGOs (Electronic Frontier Foundation,
Open Rights Group and Privacy International) were
interviewed to obtain a critical, policy-oriented per-
spective. Legal dimensions of emotion capture were
explored in interviews with media and technology law
firms, and European policymakers in the field of data
protection. A multi-tiered consent form allowed inter-
viewees to select a level of disclosure they were com-
fortable with.
Questions revolved around opportunities (trends and
growth of emotion-sensitive technology), rules (data
protection issues) and harm minimisation (corporate
behaviour, privacy and thoughts about societal accep-
tance). Qualitative thematic coding was employed to
hand code transcripts and identify commonalities of
interest across interviews (Miles et al., 2014).
Balanced with phenomenological sensitivity to the con-
text in which statements were made, coding entailed
noting the recurrence of key words and themes and
highlighting statements regarding ethics and emotional
AI. Analysis of the 33 transcripts that discussed non-
identifying emotional AI followed an adaptive
approach (Layder, 1998) to combine pre-existing
theory (on non-identifying emotional AI, privacy and
critical accounts of biometrics) with coded interview
transcripts. These were hand-coded using Cresswell’s
(1994) approach that entails topic generation, abbrevi-
ation and creation of categories. Production of initial
codes and thereafter themes were theoretically led by
the interest in non-identifying emotional AI. However,
in analysis, wider interests soon became apparent, clus-
tered under the following themes: change; method; jus-
tification; privacy and regulation; and consensus.
Workshop
The second source of empirical understandings is a cre-
ative workshop organised by this paper’s author at
Digital Catapult, London (16/09/2016).3 It was con-
ducted on the basis that privacy insights about emo-
tional AI could be disclosed through peer-based
discussion and activities. Following Veales’s (2005)
approach to creative workshops, 21 participants inter-
ested in data about emotions were asked to design eth-
ical guidelines. This took the form of a list of do’s and
don’ts. Titled Emotion Capture and Trust Workshop,
participants included representatives from the technol-
ogy industry (n¼ 10), the UK’s Information
Commissioner’s Office (n¼ 1), the UK’s advertising
self-regulator (Committee of Advertising Practice)
(n¼ 1), security companies (n¼ 3), NGOs (n¼ 1), a
psychologist (n¼ 1), legal ethicists (n¼ 2) and critical
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surveillance academics (n¼ 2). To facilitate uncon-
strained discussion, there was no audio-visual record-
ing. Instead, stakeholders designed a list of ‘dos and
don’ts’ for working with data about emotions and out-
comes in the form of A1-sized tear-off sheets which
were kept and photographed. The next and last stage
entailed the moderator (this paper’s author) summariz-
ing each group’s view and collapsing these into a
shorter set of ethical statements. These were enthusias-
tically debated and eventually agreed by participants.
Survey
This third tranche of data comprises a demographically
representative UK nationwide survey (n¼ 2068) con-
ducted in November 2015. The UK was chosen because
emotional AI is developing there apace.4 Closed-ended
questions were used to gauge lay attitudes to potential
uses of emotion detection employed in technologies
and contexts that citizens are familiar with. These
embraced its employment in social media for market
research, reactive billboards in advertising, online
games, interactive movies and voice-based search (see
Table 1 for the specific questions asked). Utilising a
multiple-choice format, response options were scaled
to reflect industry practices and the research interest
in anonymisation. Options were as follows: overall
rejection of emotion capture practices (‘not OK’);
acceptance of anonymised emotion capture practices
(‘OK anonymised’); acceptance of identifying emotion
capture (‘OK identifiable’) and a final category for
those who do not have a view or do not understand
the question (see Table 2 for response options in full).
The survey was executed online via ICMUnlimited, a
commercial survey organisation. Online surveys have
methodological caveats including difficulties of
presenting complex topics and minimal control over
respondents’ condition (attentive or distracted).
However, this approach generated a respectable weight-
ed sample of geographical regions, age groups, social
classes and gender, while avoiding social desirability
bias. This is especially pertinent in privacy-related
research that is recognised as having scope for bias
(Zureik and Stalker, 2010). On complexity, participants
were not provided further information than that con-
tained in the question. This was deemed acceptable
because the research was interested in lay responses to
plainly stated propositions about emergent technologies.
Key findings from interviews and
workshop: A weak consensus on privacy
There were notable differences of opinion on specific
aspects and motives among stakeholders with a profes-
sional interest in emotional AI. Some of the themes
established were to be expected, such as speed of techno-
logical change, defence and criticism of emotional AI
methods, but others were less obvious, and it is on
these that this paper focuses: namely, privacy and regu-
lation; and consensus. Indeed, the surprise overall finding
is one of weak consensus on need for privacy. This refers
to a temporary alignment of privacy interests between
diverse stakeholders. This alignment is not stable and is
unlikely to last because while ethical and privacy interests
currently align, the motives of stakeholders vary greatly.
All interviewees with commercial interests in profil-
ing said that it is inevitable that machines will be
employed to try to gauge feelings, emotions and inten-
tions. They were confident that emotional AI would
increase in scope and prevalence in 5–10 years.
Gabi Zijderveld from Affectiva, a sector-leading
Table 1. Closed-ended questions in UK public survey of emotion detection.
Question
1. Companies use social media data (from Facebook, Instagram, Tumblr, Flickr, Pinterest and others) to understand how we feel about
brands. To do this they analyse images we post of ourselves, and others, for brand logos and facial expressions. They do this to
understand what types of people are using their brands and what emotions they display. Which of the following best represents
your feelings about this?
2. Advertising agencies have developed outdoor ads equipped with cameras that scan onlookers’ faces to work out our emotions
towards the ad. If our reactions are not positive the ad changes itself to be more appealing. Which of the following best
represents your feelings about this?
3. Electronic games companies are beginning to make use of cameras and wearable technologies to track players’ eyes, heart rates and
respiration as they play games. They do this to heighten players’ involvement and entertainment levels. Which of the following
best represents your feelings about this?
4. Entertainment companies are developing movies (particularly thrillers) that read viewers’ faces for emotional reactions when
viewed on a smartphone, tablet or other device with a camera. They do this to personalize stories for viewers as the content
unfolds and provide different storylines. Which of the following best represents your feelings about this?
5. Voice analytics companies collect information about moods and emotions from voice data (not just ‘what’ people say, but ‘how’ they
say it). If applied to smartphones and voice-based search (rather than typing), this offers opportunity for devices that can react
appropriately to emotions. Which of the following best represents your feelings about this?
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company that uses facial coding to understand emo-
tion, represents the overall view of interviewees from
emotion-based companies. She says:
We believe that this tech will be ubiquitous in the
future, maybe five years; we’ll see a lot of the tech
that we interact with on a daily basis using emotion.
We see a lot of tech with human-tech interaction play-
ing out in a digital context. With smart AI systems we
need to understand how human emotions factor into
this. We believe this is largely missing today and this is
a negative thing. (Interview 2016)
This view was echoed in many other interviews with
those from the emotion capture industry. For example,
in early 2016, Yoram Levanon of Beyond Verbal, a
company that specialises in extracting information
about emotion from voice, speculated that in five to
ten years emotional AI would be embedded in call
centres and market research. After ten years, he says
that the relationships between people and machines
will become closer by means of emotional AI, such as
through homecare by robots that understand people and
respond appropriately. Others pointed to trends in
appearance. For example, Kim Du from Emotiv, that
makes EEG headwear, said that in five to ten years
devices will become smaller and less visible. Looking
further, she suggested that by twenty years sensors will
be embedded not just in us, but in everything people
interact with. Her vision is one where sensors at work
and home feel-into, optimize and intuitively adjust set-
tings, so people do not have to manually initiate things.
Although applications differ, each interviewee working
directly with psycho-physiological data foresees ubiqui-
tous feeling-into by devices and environments. No inter-
viewee deviated from this view.
Each interviewee recognized privacy as a concern yet
had different perspectives on why it is an issue. Coming
from a health background (although Emotiv’s head-
wear is widely used in market and user experience
research), Kim Du states:
It’s your brain data. Right now there’s no regulations,
starting with security about how wearable companies
are collecting the data they’re collecting about their
users. It’s an ethical issue given no policy guidance.
(Interview 2016)
Surprisingly (given Silicon Valley’s antipathy to regu-
lation), Emotiv were not the only US firm to complain
of a lack of clarity. No company sought extra legisla-
tion, but absence of explicit rules was a recurring theme.
On privacy, other interviewees, such as Mike Ambinder
from the biofeedback gaming company Valve, pointed
to ‘opt-in’ processes of consent as a primary privacy
tool, which supports his value-based argument that
Valve intend to ‘do right by Valve’s users’ and only
use biometric technologies in a transparent manner to
improve gaming experiences (Interview 2016).
A handful of commercially oriented interviewees see
opportunity in privacy-by-design techniques. One
smartphone app developer interested in emotions and
video-calls stated a preference for ‘edge computing’
because ‘Anything that is processed by the cloud entails
resale of emotions and an after-market of emotions:
this presents dangers’ (Anonymised Interview 2016).
However, importantly, the interest in privacy ethics
is not just ethical, but also entails commercial self-
interest. Commercially oriented interviewees recognize
that alongside other parties, client perceptions need to
be managed.
An interviewee from a global technology firm exem-
plifies the overall view of emotion capture businesses
stating, ‘the reason why emotion detection has not
scaled as quickly as expected has less to do with the
technology itself, but reticence of clients and their
desire to avoid a PR backlash’ (Anonymised
Interview 2016). Gawain Morrison of Sensum5 echoes
this, saying emotions are ‘that final personal frontier’
and ‘Super-tech companies are paranoid about being
seen to do the wrong thing, such as facial coding’. In
reference to adding emotional AI to existing media,
Morrison adds: ‘No-one will hurt shareholders or
their bottom line with an unnecessary bolt-on. It’s a
powerful tool and it will require a new company to
take it into the setting before it’s accepted. The old
guys are untrusting’ (Interview 2016).
Table 2. Response options in UK survey on public views of emotion detection.
Response options
1. I am not OK with my data being collected in this way.
2. I am OK with data collection about my emotions in this way as long as the information is anonymised and cannot be associated with
me, my email address, phone number or any other possible means of personally identifying me.




The workshop held at Digital Catapult was primar-
ily organised to create self-generated guidelines for
technologists and businesses working with emotional
AI. Attendees concluded with a range of overlapping
suggestions. While focused issues were discussed
regarding psychological suppositions (e.g. reliability
of ‘basic emotions’), appropriate time length of data
storage, racial and cultural difference regarding emot-
ing, potential for citizen manipulation, the right to be
forgotten, scope for pre-crime analytics, repurposing of
collected data and user experience, the workshop dele-
gates were asked to agree some basic rules. They said
that ‘Do’s’ should include ‘put the person first’; ‘put
them in control’; that ‘external and internal guidelines
are necessary’ (i.e. regulations) and ‘autonomy and
choice’. Unanimously, they also agreed ‘use of data
about emotions should be proportionate to the goal’,
and that ‘users’ benefit trumps commercial gain’. On
‘Don’ts’, they agreed that those in the business of emo-
tion detection should ‘not be covert’ (regardless of
whether identifying or not) and they should not use
emotion as the ‘be and end all of profiling’. These are
familiar liberal approaches to privacy, involving auton-
omy, control, capacity for management and transpar-
ency. Yet, given that participants were told that an
overview of the findings would be published and dis-
seminated by Digital Catapult, an important organiza-
tion in the UK and European digital industry ecology,
the uniformity and strength of recommendations is
surprising.
Despite this overall emergent finding of a weak con-
sensus on the need for privacy in emotional AI, there
were outlying attitudes. These came from the retail and
advertising sectors. Few interviewees here were queasy
about emotion detection in public spaces if the data is
not legally personal data. Realeyes, for example, saw
no problem in teaming with the retailer Mothercare6 to
attempt to track the emotional states of customers and
biometric reactions to promotions, store layout and
(clearly involving personal data) the behaviour of
store assistants (Interview 2016). As also noted in
McStay (2016), it was advertising companies (including
representatives from Havas, Ogilvy & Mather, DataXu
and M&C Saatchi) who argued most clearly that emo-
tionally relevant advertising serves citizens as well as
businesses (Interviews 2015–2016). Yvonne O’Brien of
Havas, for example, sees ‘opportunities in biometrics
and thereafter insight into emotional life’. Later in
interview (but still in context of emergent technology),
she asserted skepticism about privacy concerns because
people continue to use services (such as social media)
that are said to be privacy invasive. Rather, for
O’Brien, citizens will willingly provide data about emo-
tions to have meaningful interaction with brands
(Interview 2016).
Perhaps surprisingly, the weak consensus on privacy
(excluding advertising and retail) also includes NGOs
working in data protection. While they raised concerns,
they did not dismiss using emotions to interact with
technologies if liberal privacy principles are respected.
On fears, Gus Hosein of Privacy International (views
not representative of organisation) observed that emo-
tional AI makes us prone to subtle manipulation.
Hosein cites state surveillance of populations and com-
mercial interest in understanding purchase intention.
This is realised in China as it uses emotional AI in
public spaces such as airports, railway stations and
other parts of smart city infrastructure (Wong and Liu
2019). Similarly, Dubai (or ‘Smart Dubai’), for example,
analyses sentiment and retail spending trends and
employs in-house psycho-physiological measures (using
Emotiv headwear) to understand happiness in the region
(Anonymised Interview 2016). On emotional AI and
soft biometrics, Hosein says this ‘freaks me out’ and
‘we don’t have the legal frameworks’ (Interview 2015).
On being asked about emotional AI that does not make
use of personal data, he reasons ‘it is still taking some-
thing from me. . . it is still interacting with me. . . it is
interfacing without my say so’.
Yet, Hosein also highlighted enabling aspects of new
technologies. Key factors for him are ‘control’, and a
‘say on outcomes’. These principles align with industry
views described earlier, indicating that the views of
industry and pro-privacy groups are not oppositional.
Hosein’s were not outlying comments: interviews with
Jim Killock and Javier Ruiz from Open Rights Group
in 2016 continued this theme. While sceptical of indus-
try claims to anonymisation, on use of emotion detec-
tion when matched with identifiable data, Killock
spoke of ‘legitimate services’, saying that there is an
argument to be made for emotional AI and first-
party relationships with services and vendors (also
noted by Valve’s Ambinder).
A more antagonistic response was expected. Instead,
Killock insisted that liberal principles of control,
awareness, meaningful consent and better regulation
by centralized institutions are required. An interview
with Jeremy Gillula of the US Electronic Frontier
Foundation (views not representative of organisation)
found Gillula arguing that a person should be aware of
what is being collected, adding: ‘If you’re aware that
machines are tracking your emotions to make interac-
tions better, that’s OK’. As an example, he says, ‘If my
smartphone understands that I’m angry and can pro-
vide a response that calms me down, that’s OK’
(Interview 2016). Echoing the smartphone app devel-
oper, he said that what matters is that information is
secure and that the device owner has control over
whether data is shared to the cloud. His criticisms
were less about commercial uses of emotional AI,
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but governmental and policing awareness of moods
(such as anger), accountability to devices that pertain
to read emotions, algorithmic biases in interpreting of
emotions, and how information about emotions might
be used in courts, such as in a divorce subpoena.
On regulation, Gillula diverged from UK NGOs.
Reflecting EFF’s libertarian roots, he is wary of
increased government regulation because technology
evolves quicker than law. Yet, he adds that companies
should be open to independent auditing of security and
that they should have a legal duty to tell users how
their data is processed. Omer Tene (Vice President of
Research and Education of International Association
of Privacy Professionals (IAPP)) made a similar argu-
ment. Stating that technological progress is inevitable,
he suggests that at best privacy advocates can try to
adjust social norms and policies to limit or moderate it
(Interview 2016). Speaking of his own views rather than
IAPP’s, he says that it is difficult to see government
curtailing development of emotional AI. Recognising
potential privacy issues, he believes emotional AI will
grow and be widely used. Tene says that new types of
data-intensive technology always trigger privacy hot-
spots, adding, ‘One juncture you’re bound to bump
into is children’. This point was made in reference to
emergent tracking of emotion in schools. Tene says
that, ‘I think there’ll be angst from parents on the
impacts on opportunities of their kids down the road’.
To summarise, the interviews and workshop found
that the emotional AI sector is likely to grow rapidly
within the next five or so years. A hard-core element
(advertising) sees little wrong with collecting emotional
data in bulk because it reasons that greater consumer
understanding will lead to better service from market-
ers. However, the majority consensus evident across
commercial, regulatory and NGO sectors is that more
ethical industrial practices (such as opt-in consent) will
win public trust; and that there is a creepy factor to be
overcome. What, however, do citizens actually think of
these emerging practices? Are they party to the emerg-
ing weak consensus?
UK survey findings
Reported feelings from UK citizens showed little vari-
ance across different media and technological forms
(sentiment analysis, out-of-home advertising, gaming,
interactive movies, voice and mobile phones).
Similarly, gender, social class and region did not pro-
duce noticeable differences. As detailed in Table 3, the
overall mean averages for all forms of emotional AI are
as follows: half of UK citizens (50.6%) are ‘not OK’
with it in any form; almost a third (30.7%) are ‘OK’
with it if the application does not personally identify
them; less than a tenth (8.3%) are ‘OK’ with having
data about their emotions connected with personally
identifiable information and a tenth (10.4%) do not
know. At this level, there is no reason to suggest that
UK citizens, taken as a totality, share the weak con-
sensus among other stakeholders regarding privacy-
friendly approaches to emotional AI.
However, as reported in Table 4, age was the sole
factor in attitudinal differences to emotional AI. For
example, the mean average of 18–24s ‘not OK’ with
emotional AI is almost a third (31.4%), whereas the
overall figure of all age groups is just over half
(50.6%). This upward trend of being ‘not OK’ with
emotional AI ends with the over 65s whose overall
mean average is 66.3% ‘not OK’. In effect, this means
that the oldest people sampled are more than twice as
likely to be ‘not OK’ with emotional AI than the youn-
gest people. Conversely, if ‘non-identifying OKs’ and
‘identifying OKs’ for 18–24s are combined, this means
56.8% of 18–24s are ‘OK’ with some form of emotional
AI. Looking to future generations, there is no obvious
reason why this figure should decrease given increase in
use of networked devices and services (Ofcom, 2019).
However, this does not mean that younger people are
‘OK’ with having data about their emotions linked with
personally identifying data. While older people are cer-
tainly less keen on being identified when having data
about emotions processed (only 1.7% are ‘OK’ with
this), 18–24s show little indication of being comfortable
with emotion capture practices that identify them either
(only 13.7% are ‘OK’ with this).
This paper speculates that younger people are more
open to novel forms of engagement with technology
but remain wary of identifying processes. On this
basis, there is a case to be made that younger people
might be party to a weak consensus on the basis of
control-based accounts of privacy. Nevertheless, it
should be kept in mind that the 18–24s are a small
percentage of an overall suspicious citizenry. On atti-
tudinal differences between age groups, the survey
methodology shows its weaknesses. However, specula-
tively, the generation most open to emotion detection
was born between 1991 and 1997, when the web
emerged as a mass medium. Further, according to






1 (Not OK) 1028 50.6%
2 (OK/no personal identification) 687 30.7%
3 (OK/personal identification) 163 8.3%
4 (Don’t know) 190 10.4%
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UK findings by media regulator Ofcom (2019), this
generation displays the highest levels of internet usage
per week; is highly likely to use lots of websites/apps; is
most likely to access the internet via smartphones and
shows high overall levels of interactive media use. It is
also most likely to be very confident about staying safe
online, least likely to have read terms and conditions
thoroughly, yet most likely to have changed social
media settings of specific sites to be more private.
Thus, although younger people are open to new expe-
riences, this should not be mistaken for not caring
about privacy.
Discussion: A critical window for the weak
consensus
This paper has accounted for the growth of emotional
AI that assesses bodies for indication of emotional
states. Its first contribution is that it has pushed for-
ward the privacy debate by diagnosing an over-
emphasis on identification in data privacy regulation
and omission of non-identifying soft biometric data
about emotional life.
Its second is the finding that over half of UK citizens
are ‘not OK’ with the principle of emotion detection
(identifiable or otherwise) and that this has no current
remedy in UK or European law. Especially, when pri-
vacy is seen in terms of bodily integrity (Nussbaum,
1999), this takes us beyond questions of personal
data and identification, to dignity and the right for
people to have self-determination over their own
bodies. Privacy as dignity does not hinge on identifica-
tion and, as a result, may be extended to groups, espe-
cially given interest in objectifying emotions without
opt-in consent for commercial gain. On what should
be done to promote dignity in relation to emotional
AI and soft biometrics, if regulatory action is deemed
necessary, there is scope to do this within the frame-
work of GDPR as Article 9(4) grants capacity for
Member States to maintain or introduce further con-
ditions or limitations with regard to the processing of
genetic data, biometric data or health data. As a result,
argued through the prism of emotional AI and [soft]
biometric data, this paper echoes Wachter’s call for
‘new protections based on holistic notions of “data
about people” and group conceptions of privacy’
(2020: 55).
Third and finally, there is the unusual consensus on
privacy among industry and data protection NGOs,
providing opportunity for regulatory change.
Although older people (over-55s) were ‘not OK’ with
emotional AI, and therefore not party to the weak con-
sensus, younger people appear party to the weak con-
sensus on the basis of a control-based account of
privacy (that is, they are happy to interact with tech-
nologies but want a meaningful say over the process),
also suggesting that antagonism will reduce in future
decades. Interviewees working with voice, facial coding
and body measurement data about emotions all said
they ‘feel strongly’ about opt-in processes of consent.
One might see this as an obvious tactic to brush-off a
critical interviewer, but the scope for a high creepy
factor means that interviewees also have to manage
reputational concerns of existing and potential clients,
as well as regulators. This means control-oriented opt-
in is not just the dignity-enhancing thing to do, but also
the self-interested thing to do. With the exception of
the advertising sector, the convergence and consensus
between industry interviewees and NGOs regarding
identifying and non-identifying emotion detection was
surprising. While data protection NGOs expressed con-
cern about data privacy and social manipulation, they
did not dismiss the premise of emotional AI if citizens
have meaningful control over processes. However,
again, this weak consensus only exists because the
creepy factor associated with emotional AI currently
acts as a brake on industry. The technology industry
is keen to foreground privacy credentials while it is
expedient, but the fragile alignment of interests is
unlikely to last. Given that industrial stakeholders see
that these technologies will become more popular in the
early 2020s, this paper concludes that now is the time to
take advantage of this unusual consensus by regulating
use of both identifying and group data about emotions
and related psycho-physiological behaviour.
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1) Not OK 31.4% 38.7% 48.6% 48.1% 62.0% 66.3%
2) OK/no personal identification 43.1% 35.5% 29.0% 32.3% 25.2% 24.0%
3) OK/ personal identification 13.7% 13.9% 11.7% 8.0% 3.4% 1.7%
4) Don’t know 11.8% 12.0% 10.7% 11.6% 9.5% 8.0%
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1. For legal examination of device-level empathic media, see
Clifford (2017) who offers a thorough analysis of emotion
capture in relation to the GDPR and ePrivacy Directive.
Uniquely, he also draws attention to the Unfair
Commercial Practices Directive, arguing for a precaution-
ary approach to technologies that may unduly influence
rational economic behaviour and decision-making.
2. I do not draw directly on each of the interviews in this
paper, but they are utilized more fully in Emotional AI:
The Rise of Empathic Media (McStay, 2018). However,
they have indirectly shaped suppositions, assertions and
argumentation in this paper.
3. Digital Catapult advises, nurtures and shares learning
about start-up digital projects.
4. Excluding Northern Ireland.
5. Sensum uses multiple biometric means to understand audi-
ences’ emotional responses to various media.
6. The store specialises in products for expectant mothers
and children.
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